zeller

Thomas Zeller

EE Draft 1 Two days before the Christmas of 2008 two friends and I clipped into our skis expecting ten inches of freshly fallen snow. We made our way to a gully near Winter Park, Colorado. We had skied here numerous time in previous seasons but this was from what we could tell was untouched. The warning signs should have been obvious: new snow with limited time to settle, early season snowpack, and warmer temperatures foreshadowed what was about to occur. My friends and I were oblivious to these factors because we lacked avalanche training. I went first, choosing a line directly down the ridge that ended with a mandatory ten-foot drop. I was just two turns into my line when I heard a loud “whooph” and the snow avalanched all the way down to the rock into what is known as a glide avalanche. After the entire snowpack glided off its bed of granite, I was carried down to the base of the gully and buried up to my neck. I was not wearing an avalanche beacon, carrying an avalanche probe or a shovel. My friends, who were also without these essential tools, were luck to be able to find me and dig me out. I was miraculously unhurt. However, for me, and any others who dare to play in the backcountry without proper avalanche training, a disaster is always waiting to happen. Unintentional avalanches caused by humans have been on the rise since the 1980s [i]. This trend parallels the rise in backcountry recreation and many of the individuals who venture into the backcountry do so without formal avalanche training. They are just as ignorant to natural warning signs of snow instability as I was. These uneducated individuals pose a danger to themselves and the members of their party. To what extent does avalanche education affect a backcountry outdoorsman’s potential to unintentionally cause an avalanche? Although avalanches involve many variables, individuals who are properly educated are more likely to make the right choices and use proper risk management techniques while in avalanche terrain. Because of this, it is in the interest of the federal government to provide adequate avalanche education to avoid the unnecessary use of taxpayer dollars and state resources used when rescuing and treating victims of avalanches that could have been avoided by simple education. This also makes it in the interest of all people because their taxpayer dollars are going towards the health and rescue costs of avoidable incidents. Although avalanches may not affect most people directly, the cost of avalanche victim’s affects almost everyone indirectly. Avalanches are a natural phenomenon but are more often than not triggered by humans. The specific type of pressure that skiers, snowboarders, and snowmobiles apply to the snowpack plays a major role in destabilizing the snow causing it to slide. Loose snow avalanches are caused by humans but are not nearly as dangerous as slab avalanches. Of the many types of avalanches, the type most commonly instigated by humans is known as a slab avalanche. Slabs are defined as single or multiple layers within the snowpack with sufficient internal cohesion to move independently from the rest of the snowpack or the ground. The term “soft slab” refers to the layer of new snow that forms after a snowstorm and has not yet settled into the rest of the snowpack, allowing it to slide independently from the older and denser snow. The term “hard slab” refers to snow that is pushed by the wind over imperfections on the ground, resulting in wind drifts and cornices. These structural features cause discontinuity in the snowpack, resulting in destabilization. Naturally slabs will usually settle into the snowpack with the help of wind and changing densities due to temperature. Slabs of any kind can still be triggered to slide long after snowfall because of drifting and density changes. When warm temperatures followed by freezing temperatures form a weak layer, this results in a deformation that facets the upper layer of the snowpack creating what is known as surface hoar. This weak layer provides a lubricating surface on which the cohesive layer can slide. However, when a human trigger is the cause when this layer releases from the snowpack. Backcountry skiers and snowboarders are attracted to terrain features such as ridges, cliffs, cornices, and chutes. These same imperfections are the most susceptible to instability cause by wind. When a human does cause a slab avalanche it is because they have interfered with the process of settlement. In the words of Bruce Tremper, an avalanche expert, “snow, just like people, does not like rapid change” [ii]. When an individual applies the pressure of their bodyweight to a snowpack with poor bonding an effect called bridging occurs. This means that the weight of the person is spread out over a larger area. Bonding also plays a large role in this. Bonding, when used to describe snow, refers to the cohesiveness between the individual flakes of snow, layers of the snow, and the strength of the connection between the snowpack and the earth. Larger slabs are usually bonded well to the ground or the base layer of the snowpack at some points but if significant pressure is applied to the snowpack then these bonds fail. This is why often when a skier sets off an avalanche the actual fracture point is far above them. This is also why snowmobiles cause the most unintentional avalanches of any recreation group. Snowmobile riders make up 43% of avalanche fatalities [iii] because of their increased weight and corresponding potential to apply pressure to the snowpack. To simulate how snowpack can fracture naturally and through human causes I used an experiment that modeled a slope after a variety of snowfalls. I used brown sugar to represent the bed layer of the snowpack because of its cohesive ability, flour because of its resemblance to a new snowfall, granular sugar to represent surface hoar. I placed these on a piece of cardboard that was fastened to the table with tape and had a string to adjust its angle. I predicted that when pressure at any angle or mixture of snow, the snow would fracture easier when pressure was applied. I built my snowpack first using only a bed layer and a new snow layer. At 45 degrees, maximum avalanche potential, the snowpack remained stable. When I added surface hoar between the bed and new snow layers, the new snow slid at 39 degrees. I repeated the creation of these two models again but this time used a pencil and applied pressure with my finger to simulate the stress caused by a skier on the snowpack. This resulted in the first stable snowpack releasing at 40 degrees with substantial pressure and the unstable slope releasing at 30 degrees with minimum pressure. These findings supported my hypothesis that regardless of stability, snow is more likely to avalanche when pressure is applied. [iv] Although humans contribute to avalanche danger there are many elements outside of human control that determine the stability of a snowpack. In many cases humans are not the force that triggers the avalanche. An example of this occurred in Utah during the 2003-2004 season. The area known as Aspen Grove had received a significant amount of snowfall in the days prior to the day of the incident. Three separate parties were in the region: three snowboarders making their way up to the top, a pair of skiers traversing a ridge, and a family of 5 sledding at the base of the mountain. A slab avalanche released in an avalanche path high all parties present on the mountain, burying the three snow boarders, and narrowly missing the others. When investigated, the slab appeared to have released because of the weight added by the new snowfall. Natural avalanches were the cause of half of Utah’s avalanche deaths in the season of 2003-2004 [v]. This just goes to show that humans are not always in control of what happens in the mountains. When a deformation in the snowpack occurs, the snow will most likely slide with or without human involvement. After all, avalanches have been around longer than humans. Because of this the more we know and can control about avalanches, the safer we can be while in their domain. Even though humans do not trigger these type of avalanches, they can still possess the knowledge of how to avoid being buried in them. It is in the interest of the government to fund a comprehensive avalanche education program because of the resources that are unnecessarily expended on victims of avoidable avalanches. To demonstrate this point, imagine this proposed scenario: An uneducated skier has just been injured in an avalanche that they caused and needs a flight for life helicopter ride to stay alive. At the same time an unavoidable car crash has occurred and victims in that crash need a helicopter ride to the hospital to stay alive. Both need the helicopter to stay alive. The helicopter is forced to make two separate trips and as a result costs the government more money and endangers the lives of the skier and the car crash victims. The fact of the matter is that victims of unintentional avalanches use up state resources that could be going elsewhere. The Government provides the forest service with money that is used to fund avalanche centers. For the most part this money goes toward the salaries and expenses of forecasting an avalanche. Of the $168,654 spent by the Utah Avalanche center, $2000 went to avalanche education. With this money they were able to hold 38 talks and educate 1758 people [vi]. The problem with this system is that there is no comprehensive system assuring that these enthusiasts know everything they need to know. These free state programs provided by Avalanche centers offer only the most rudimentary skills and lack the hands on experience needed to understand a snowpack. There is no established curriculum for these courses provided by the government. If an individual desire to be trained to the fullest extent of a recreational athlete they are forced to pay a private entity to train them. Because of the cost and in some cases the inaccessibility of sufficient avalanche training centers, people are less inclined to take the coarse, If the government was to provide an established curriculum through avalanche centers and funded it, this would make avalanche education more available and would potentially allow more people to become educated. An example of an under funded Avalanche center occurred this past winter in Jackson hole where 14 people were killed by avalanches over the course of a month. The variable snowpack forced the Jackson Avalanche Center to burn through half of their budget for Avalanche prevention in the first month of the season [vii]. It is nearly impossible to close the backcountry to recreation so when a government agency is so stripped of resources that it cannot keep people safe, it will inevitably result in deaths. No Avalanche Center, regardless of how well they are funded can protect people against bad snow conditions if people cannot use the avalanche forecasts they provide. What the government must realize is that without widespread education, individuals that are uneducated cannot be expected to know the risks they are taking. Many uneducated individuals fail to even check avalanche advisories before going into the backcountry. People need to be educated to protect themselves against variable conditions in the backcountry that the Avalanche centers cannot protect them from. Because of this education need to be universal and the only way that can be done effectively and successfully in through governmental means. The education of backcountry athletes is essential to safety in the backcountry because it teaches not only snowpack evaluation, but also risk management techniques. Avalanche education is taught in three levels: Level one teaches general knowledge about mountains and snowpack and the basics of snowpack evaluation, Level 2 teaches a more focused course on snowpack evaluation and how to read terrain, level 3 is a comprehensive multi day course that teaches scientific facts about snowpack, it is meant for individuals who guide or make their careers in avalanche terrain. The government provides for the most part level 1 training so to know enough to be safe as a skier, paying for a course is almost always essential. The other thing that all of these courses teach is effective use of tools. This is essential because studies have shown that the more a person uses their beacon, probe, and shovel, the better prepared they will be to find a companion when buried [viii]. State sponsored avalanche courses do not have this hands on training in the field so theoretically they are sending people out into the backcountry without the knowledge necessary to efficiently operate their tools. Efficient use of these tools is almost always a matter of life and death because within 10 minutes of a slide releasing over half of victims who are buried die [ix]. Avalanche education does not only prevent risky decisions in avalanche terrain, it helps save lives when avalanches do happen. Training may decrease an individual’s potential to cause an avalanche but it does not immunize tem from making bad choices. In Ian McCammon’s study “(”, he compares the risk management skills of different avalanche victims and their corresponding level of avalanche education. To do this he used this equation: risk=(probability of occurrence) x vulnerability The probability of occurrence was calculated by giving each case a hazard score based on warning signs of an avalanche like a high advisory or an obvious avalanche path. Vulnerability was expressed as a mitigation score which took into account whether the group wore beacons and traveled with two or more people. Using this calculation, this study discovered that the avalanches caused by bad decisions did not decrease with training; more training did not improve risk management. Also people with formal training had a greater tendency to expose members of their group to avalanche danger than people without training.   McCammon’s rationalization of these results reveals flaws with not only how avalanche training is taught, but the idea of avalanche training in general. In terms of how avalanche training is taught, one main problem persists: location. Level one and two avalanche course are usually taught indoors not in the field. Therefore with their limited knowledge individuals go out into the field without knowing what rules apply to where. Because of this, people develop what are call heuristics. Heuristics is a theory that states that humans in unfamiliar situations will apply simple rules that can become systematic biases. For instance a hueristic thinker might develop the rule to “avoid 30 degree slopes on high hazard days” [x]. Because they lack defined rules people develop guidelines to make sense of a situation and will not abandon tem until they clearly fail. Behaviorally, McCammon stated that effective instruction that avoids heuristics involves “clearly communicating the specific skills and expectations of the course, subdividing skills and expectations into manageable tasks, and role modeling the skill competently and consistently.” This flaw can be remedied by clarity and repetition in the classroom and the field, so that the heuristics that are used will actually help keep people safe. McCammon’s explanation for why well trained individuals cause avalanches is very different. Experts who put themselves in dangerous situations usually do so out of confidence. In some cases individuals believe that because they have extensive training that they will be able to get away safely even if they do cause an avalanche. In other cases, experts are not safe from bad judgment. In all levels of training McCammon noted cases of individuals using what is know as ballistic reasoning. This refers to when people have ignored an obvious risk such a wind loading or recent avalanche activity and still used the slope. Ballistic reasoning is usually used by our minds because it lessens confusion and can raise confidence in what an individual is doing. However in a high risk situation ballistic reasoning can be deadly. One way experts have combated this is by external attribution. This term descries the process of reviewing an error by a pervious individual and discussing why they made the error and what the result was. Seeing a cause and effect demonstration often leads to better understanding of risk factors. McCammon also discusses the limits within avalanche education in general. In this he cites a theory called “risk homeostasis” [xi], a theory that states that people are continually at risk no matter how much education they receive because of the human flaw of confidence. Because people are educated they believe themselves more able to venture in more variable terrain. The confidence education gives people lead them to believe themselves immune to the risks of avalanches. This makes their risk factor equal to what it was prior to training. Also, experts agree that there will always be a baseline of incidents that will not curb with education. In McCammon’s study, of the 344 avalanches he looked at, 4% had a hazard score of zero [xii]. The factors beyond human control, combined with the human ambition to seek out steep and dangerous slopes will always cause avalanche deaths. However, in terms of fatal avalanches, 98% of those McCammon studied could have been avoided with education. It is simple logic that knowing something is better than knowing nothing at all. The problems McCammon discusses in his study area all problems with how humans use the knowledge they get from avalanche training. These problems are learning problems that can be remedied. The fact of the matter is that people are better off with training than they are without it. Despite its shortcomings and conflicts with the human being, education will always play an extremely important role in the safety of outdoor enthusiasts. Any way that avalanche education can be spread to a larger audience can, and will save lives. To conclude I would like to finish the story I began at the beginning. After I was scared straight by my own near miss I sought out a friend with avalanche training and a ski patrol background to help me stay safe in the backcountry. My story thus far has ended happily but there are countless examples of people who weren’t lucky enough to get a second chance. What it comes down to is that people need to not only acknowledge the risk they take when playing in the backcountry, they need to understand it. If the current system of avalanche education continues people will continue to wander into the backcountry and tempt fate with their ignorance. And when disasters do happen, taxpayers will spend money on unnecessary rescues and medical care. The simple solution is obvious: create a government program educating people about avalanches. Whether you are a snowmobile rider, a skier, or a snowboarder the more you know the safer you will be. What really matters is coming home safely after a great day of playing in the mountains.

[i] (Snow and Avalanches Annual Report 2003-2004 24) [ii] (Tremper 53) [iii] Snow and Avalanches Annual Report 2003-2004 24) [iv] Proceadure modified from expiriment used by ASU science class http://gk12.asu.edu/Lessons/Earth%20and%20Space%20Sciences/Avalanche!/avalanchepacket.pdf [v] (Snow and Avalanches Annual Report 2003-2004 18)  [vi]  [vi]  (Snow and Avalanches Annual Report 2003-2004 30)  [vii] (Erb 2008 1) [viii] (Tremper 39)  [ix] (Tremper 42)  [x] (The Role of Training In Recreational Avalanche Accidents in the United States 4) [xi] (Wilde, 1994).  [xii] (The Role of Training In Recreational Avalanche Accidents in the United States 6)